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ABSTRACT

The May Fourth Movement, which occurred ninety years ago in 1919, has long been characterized as a patriotic event in textbooks and mainstream media, a collective memory to be refreshed and glorified periodically. The author seeks to characterize what kind of patriotism it was and its relationships with the cosmopolitanism, social regeneration, and individualism of the New Culture Movement of the period. The May Fourth Movement, after turning into a social movement, would inevitably become more ideology-driven and more political. Post-1922 fervor for politics, having emerged from the New Cultural Movement, had a distinctive doctrinal commitment and was fueled by specific ideology. But after 1922, in the wake of the upheaval of the May Fourth Movement and the continuous social movements, all social classes became dissatisfied with the warlord rule and the Beiyang government. The catalyzing effects of both ideology and social movement paved the way for the Nationalist Revolution. Like the May Fourth Movement, the Nationalist Revolution had its catalyst, which was nothing other than the consciousness of nationalism, being suppressed by the cosmopolitanism of the May Fourth period. What is stressed here is that social movement was not cultural movement. New Culture Movement could simply import theories and tolerate diversity, but a social movement needed mass mobilization and the propagation of ideas.

Keywords: May Fourth Movement, social movement, patriotism, nationalism, 1919

Introduction

Along with China's economic rise, nationalism has become a forceful and pervasive ideology. The May Fourth Movement, which occurred ninety years ago in 1919, has long been characterized as a patriotic event in textbooks and mainstream media, a collective memory to be refreshed and glorified periodically.¹ Indeed, the May Fourth Movement contained many features of patriotism. Yet, one still has to ask: What kind of patriotism was it? What were its relationships with the cosmopolitanism, social regeneration, and individualism of the New Culture Movement of the same period? In spite of today's proliferation of research on the May Fourth, there is space for revisiting these questions.

I would like to start with the interpretations of the May Fourth Movement by two important leaders of the student movement. One of them is the head architect

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of the May Fourth Movement, Fu Sinian; and the other is the drafter of “A Statement of Beijing’s Academia”, Luo Jialun. Both wrote and examined the nature and spirit of the movement soon after the event. Fu Sinian viewed May Fourth as a social movement that expressed a sense of social responsibility.

I would not add a single word to the opinion that the May Fourth Movement is simply a patriotic movement. I attached importance to the May Fourth Movement because it was a movement of direct actions and it awakened the public’s sense of responsibility. While I absolutely oppose statism[*guojia zhuyi*][†], the sense of responsibility, (to me) is the foundation of human development.²

Luo Jialun, upon the movement’s anniversary, published an essay titled “The Failure and Success of the Past Year’s Student Movement and Our Future Direction” in *Xin chao*[New Tide]. He pointed out:

When the May Fourth Movement was at its most intense moment, everyone shouted the names of either “state-lover” or “country-traitor” in unison, but I thought the true spirit of our May Fourth Movement did not lie in here. I at the time composed an essay “the Spirit of the May Fourth Movement” and published it in the 23rd issue of *Meizhou pinglun*[Weekly Comments] on May 26, 1919. I stated that the value of our movement was not merely to “fight for the nation’s rights internationally and rid the nation of traitors domestically.” The real value lay in three genuine spirits.³

Luo Jialun summarized these spirits of the May Fourth Movement as “students’ spirit of sacrifice,” “society’s spirit of resistance,” “the nation’s spirit of self-determination.”⁴ Later, Hu Shi commented that “these three verdicts are fair assessments.”⁵ Through Luo’s and Fu’s narratives, one can tell that they understood the May Fourth as more than a simple patriotic movement that resisted international hegemony. It was inspired by the spirit of cosmopolitanism, a heroic movement that defended universal

¹ There are a narrow and a broad definition of the May Fourth Movement. In its narrow definition, the May Fourth Movement refers to the protest provoked by the failure of the peace conference in Paris. Its broad definition includes the New Culture Movement since 1915. This article uses the May Fourth Movement to mean the former. The May Fourth period, on the other hand, refers to the latter. In terms of time, the period lasts from 1915-1925.

² Fu Sinian 1919d.

³ Luo Jialun 1919a.

⁴ Luo Jialun 1919b. This essay was the first to use the term *Wusi yundong*[May Fourth Movement], which later became widely accepted. One year later, in another essay “Our Student Movement’s Success and Failure of the Past Year and the Direction of the Future,” Luo changed the third characterization from “the nation’s spirit of self-determination” to “the masses’ spirit of self-determination.” The change is noteworthy.

⁵ Hu Shi 1935.

† Translator’s note: *Guojia* is commonly translated into English as “the state”, hence *guojia zhuyi* “statism”. However, it should be noted that in modern Chinese, *guojia* also means “country”, and “the nation-state”. *Guojia zhuyi* is thus an ambiguous term. It has a strong connotation of patriotism[*aiguo zhuyi*], and is sometimes used as synonymous to nationalism[*minzu zhuyi*]. In any case, *guojia zhuyi* should not be read as the Chinese equivalent of the English word statism, which is often a derogatory term for the ideology of state interventionism.

truths[*gongli*][†], a movement of universalism that upheld global values, and a social movement that spread from intellectuals to the masses under the banner of civic responsibility.

Professor Hao Chang has emphasized repeatedly that the May Fourth complicatedly contained two orientations. It expressed the concern of nationalism as well as the spirit of cosmopolitanism. The relationship between these two is paradoxical and complicated.⁶ To scrutinize how May Fourth nationalism and cosmopolitanism, patriotic movement and social movement were entangled and imbricated historically, we have to go back to the intellectual and discursive context of modern China.

The State of Cosmopolitanism

In traditional Chinese thinking, there were only the dynasty and (the world of) all-under-heaven and no concept of modern nation-state. After China was thrust into the social-Darwinist system of global competition in the mid-nineteenth century, the consciousness of nation-state thereupon emerged. The modern state has its internal and external dimensions. Internally, it is distinct from individuals; externally, it was in contrast with the world. In the intellectual history of modern China, the two dual-concepts, “the state vs. individuals” and “the state vs. the world”, came into existence simultaneously.

The concept of the state in the late Qing period, by and large, took the form of state organism. There are two kinds of state theory in the modern times: one is state instrumentalism of classical liberalism; the other is Germanic state organism. The theory of state instrumentalism is a strain of mechanism: the atomic individual is the most important element in society and has inalienable natural rights. The state is merely instrumental in maintaining public order and defending the individual's fundamental rights. The organist view of the state, on the other hand, views the state as an organism comprising all citizens. The collective, however, is larger than the sum total of all the parts. Although the individual has intrinsic value, the state, as the collective whole of the civic organism, strives for its one purpose.

In the late Qing period, instrumentalism, in comparison with organism, had only limited influence. Individualism based on English and American methodology, as expounded by Herbert Spencer, and collectivism based on European continental methodology, as represented by Rousseau and Johann Caspar Bluntschli, had different emphases—the former on the individual and the latter on the collective—but in terms of the relationship between the individual and the state, both viewed the state as the organism where the individual and the collective were interconnected. In this

⁶ See Zhang Hao 2002:273-276.

⁷ Matsumoto Sannosuke 2005:11-12.

[†] Translator's note: *Gongli*'s most common meaning in modern Chinese is “justice”. When being used in opposition to the pre-modern notion of *tianli* “Heavenly Principle,” it denotes the modern notion of “universal truth.” In this article, this second rendition is adopted simply because of its affinity to the literal meaning of the compound word. Yet, one should keep in mind that both meanings are at play when the concept is invoked.

view, the citizen and the state constitute an undividable one. The late Qing notion of the state, rather than being directly influenced by the West, was heavily influenced by modern Japanese thought. According to Matsumoto Sannosuke's analysis, Meiji Japan's strong statism accented "the oneness of the individual and the state." "The propensity to treat the state's problem as one's personal matter, that is, to unite the self with the state, as well as the zeal and devotion for the problems concerning the state, was the Meiji generation's common and general spirit and attitude."⁷ Although a distinction was made between top-down statism, which revolved around the state, and the bottom-up statism, which revolved around individuals, both viewed the citizens and the state as an undividable and highly integrated whole. The late Qing concept of the state was deeply influenced by the new spirit of the Meiji era. Both the reformers, represented by Liang Qichao, and the revolutionaries, represented by *Guomin bao* [Newspaper Nation] and *Min bao* [Newspaper People], viewed the state as an animate organism, with independent will and spirit. The late Qing state and citizen were two sides of the same coin; they were each other's exteriority and interiority.

The late Qing notion of the state, according to Liang Qichao and Yang Du, was "a state of the world."⁸ The modern understanding of the world was no longer the Confucian moralistic order of the all-under-heaven [*tianxia*], the Mandate of Heaven [*tianming*], Heavenly Way [*tiandao*], and Heavenly Principle [*tianli*]. Instead, it was a relatively unfamiliar world to the Chinese, a physical world determined by raw power and the struggle for existence. The evolutionary theory of Darwin provided an overall synopsis of this cruel new world: competition and natural selection, the survival of the fittest. Liang Qichao wrote in 1901 that the present world amounted to a new world that functioned according to the new law of state annihilation:

State annihilation is the universal rule of evolution. All men in this world have to struggle for self-preservation. The struggle for self-preservation results in (a distinction between) the superiority and the inferiority and between victory and defeat. That which was inferior and thus defeated would witness its rights overridden by that which was superior and victorious. This is the principle of state elimination.⁹

This extremely cruel view of the world constituted the backdrop for the birth of the modern Chinese notion of the nation-state. The traditional "all-under-heaven" was an ideal world of Great Community [*datong*][†], in which benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom were the yardsticks of political legitimacy. Yet, the highest law in the modern world was the struggle for existence, with no consideration of

⁸ Liang Qichao 1912:2488.

⁹ Liang Qichao 1901b:467.

[†] Translator's note: The Great Community, *datong*, sometime rendered as "the Great Harmony", was the ultimate Confucian ideal of perfect social order, as described in the chapter "the Movement of Rites" [*Liyun*] in the *Book of Rites* [*Liji*].

(moral) values and ideals. This was understood as the universal truth of the modern world. For the purpose of self-strengthening, China needed to break itself from the traditional utopia of the Great Community of the world, and became “a state of the world”, i.e. a nation-state that was accustomed to this power-driven world order. Facing the fate of being the prey of the powerful and the threat of annexation, the late Qing society witnessed the rise of statism, patriotism, and militarization of civil education. “Patriotism has become the catchword in the past decade; both those in and out of the court are accustomed to it. All endeavors, of either public or private nature, claimed to serve the state. People of varying levels of intelligence all claimed to give priority to the state. In reality, whenever the interest of the state and that of a private person remotely clashed, has anyone given the state any thought?”¹⁰ The period between 1895 and early Republican years was indeed a time of fervent statism.

In the early Republican years, the trend of the intellectual world changed. A decade long dominance of statism helped create the Republic of China, yet it was not the ideal state that intellectuals had had in mind. Sacrifices made by individuals for the state only resulted in Yuan Shikai’s restoration of monarchy and the secret agreement to Japan’s Twenty-one Demands. Chen Duxiu, who later became a prime leader of the New Culture Movement, was the first to single his doubt about patriotism. At the end of 1914, he published an essay titled “Patriotism and Self-Awareness”, where the Chinese and Western patriotisms were contrasted: the Chinese viewed the state and the dynasty as the same, and patriotism and monarchical loyalty as synonym, while the Europeans and Americans viewed the state as a guardian of the people’s rights and the partner in the pursuit of (the people’s) happiness. “Why should one love one’s state? One should love it because it protects one’s rights and strives for one’s happiness. What should one be aware of? One should be aware of the purpose and situation of the state.” The citizens of Germany, Austria, and Japan, for example, blindly loved their states and ended up becoming accomplices of imperialism. “People love their state without knowing the purpose would surely end up supporting the self-aggrandizing leaders. The harm could be so enormous.” Finally, Chen Duxiu pointed out:

The state is to protect the people’s right and strive for the people’s happiness. If it does not focus on this, then the state commands no respect even if it continues to exist, and deserves no remorse if it perishes. [...] Only the state that protects its people warrants our love. Why should we love the state that harms its people?¹¹

This essay, as Zhang Shizhao commented, “articulated (Chen) Duxiu’s sharp insight.”¹² It nevertheless provoked a strong reaction (from readers). Some responded by condemning him as a crazy man who “knows nothing about patriotism.” The public opinion, however, soon took a sharp turn, when the news of Yuan Shikai’s

¹⁰ Liang Qichao 1915:2775.

¹¹ Chen Duxiu 1914.

¹² Zhang Shizhao 1915.

betrayal of the Republic leaked and people recognized Chen's foresight about blind patriotism. Liang Qichao, who most actively advocated statism and had the widest impact in the late Qing period, after hearing the news about Yuan Shikai's secret accord with Japan, began a self-criticism in an essay "Painful Words of Guilt", which reexamined the disastrous consequence of the citizens' blind patriotism and self-sacrifices for the government.

The government of today encourages people to love the state. Is this advice very unique? We the people shall reply: if the state deserves our love, then those who hold authority and positions should first demonstrate such love. At the present, do those who hold authority and positions take the life of the state as their own life? If not, how can they expect we people to do so? If we people really honestly devote our patriotism to the state, how do we know we would not be used by those with authority and positions for their personal purposes?¹³

Before the rise of the May Fourth intellectuals, Liang Qichao had always been the supreme leader of opinion. Even he "suddenly challenged his own position and agreed with the widely condemned Chen Duxiu." Chang Shizhao thus lamented: "Even the prudent and thoughtful ones took such a (critical) position. One can see the state of affairs."¹⁴ After 1915, patriotism that paid tribute to the nation-state was no longer the mainstream among the intellectuals. Instead, a reflective and reformist patriotism emerged. Chen Duxiu in 1916 published "My Patriotism" on the pages of *Xin qingnian*[New Youth]. Inspired by Liang Qichao's theory of "the new citizen", he now considered the strength of a nation to lie in the people's virtues, customs, and strength. The objective of national salvation depended not on the number of martyrs who died for the nation, but on the reform of national character and on the creation of a people of pragmatism and self-discipline. Chen Duxiu called them "the persistent and grounded patriots."¹⁵ The emphasis of patriotism shifted from the state to the individual. The independent individual was the first step of national salvation.

Different from the late Qing vogue of nationalism, the period of the May Fourth New Culture Movement was a time of individualism. The modern notion of the individual was born at the same time as that of the nation-state in the late Qing, but the late Qing individual was overshadowed by the collective, the citizenry that was identical with the state.¹⁶ In contrast, the notion of the individual who was distinct from and even opposed to the state emerged during the period of the New Culture Movement. When the individual was differentiated from the state and became a distinctive and self-evident notion that signified a certain depth of the self, then the theory of state organism lost its ground of existence. The citizen and the

¹³ Liang Qichao 1915:2776.

¹⁴ Zhang Shizhao 1915.

¹⁵ Chen Duxiu 1916b.

¹⁶ For a detailed analysis of the late Qing conception of the nation, see Xu Jilin 2005.

state no longer formed an inseparable organism. The relationship became one of means and aim; the state became the political vehicle for the people to realize their rights.

The *Jiayin zazhi* [Magazine *Jiayin*] played an significant role in facilitating this transition from state organism to state instrumentalism. This journal was founded in spring 1914. Many of its writers, such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Gao Yihan, and Yi Baisha, later became the core of *Xin qingnian*. The editor in chief Chang Shizhao studied in England and was influenced by the classical Liberalism of the Great Britain. In 1915, he had already pointed out that “China’s big trouble lies in people’s ignorance about what the state is. They think the state is sacred, and its principle inviolable.”¹⁷ What is the state? Zhang followed the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition and argued that “the state was the unification of a free people for the sake of the public good, the enjoyment of their inalienable rights, and the share of justice with others.”¹⁸ In response to the late Qing and early Republican theorists who exalted the power of the state and failed to differentiate the state and government, and the popular opinions that wrongly equated the government with the state, Zhang painstakingly made a theoretical distinction between the state and government. The so-called state was the ontological entity of the right to govern; the so-called government is the authoritative organ that administers the political matters on behalf of the will of the state. “The government emanates from the constitution and the state does not. The state created the constitution, not *vice versa*. From the state emerged the constitution and then the government. The state stood purely beyond and above politics.”¹⁹

Zhang Shizhao’s instrumentalism won acclaim from people such as Chen Duxiu and Gao Yihan and was elaborated later on the pages of *Xin qingnian* and *Xin chao* [New Tide]. Gao Yihan, a returned student from Japan, was the most knowledgeable about political philosophy in the New Culture Movement. When expounding the three stages of evolution in modern political thought, Gao analyzed first the changes in the notion of the state. From his viewpoint, the ancient times, such as during the classical Greek and Roman periods, the state was the highest purpose of human life. The people’s rights were sacrificed for the state. The eighteenth century European thought of new statism, expounded by thinkers such as Fichte, Hegel, Mazzini, and Green, also took the state as the highest ideal. But the recent trend of political thought changed. “It has been confirmed that the state has no purpose of its own; it takes human purpose as its own.”²⁰ This “human” was not an abstract group but (the aggregate) of the concrete individuals, the “small selves” that the Enlightenment thinkers, such as Gao, emphasized. Gao Yihan clearly stated this in another essay:

¹⁷ Zhang Shizhao 1915.

¹⁸ Zhang Shizhao 1914.

¹⁹ Zhang Shizhao 1914.

²⁰ Gao Yihan 1918.

The goals of the republican citizens were not of direct pertinence to the state. Instead, they aimed to utilize the state to achieve the small selves' goals. The state is set up for the small selves' aspirations; it is a human creation for protecting the liberties and rights of the small selves, so that they can develop their own innate abilities and thereby further the completion of humanity.²¹

The state was no more a sacred being with divine will and intent; nor was it a historical product of natural evolution. Rather, it was an artificial construction, a tool for the protection of individual liberties and natural rights. This utilitarian and instrumentalist theory of the state was popular during the New Culture Movement and constituted the mainstream view. This position was adopted not only by *Xin qingnian* and *Xin chao*, but also by *Dongfang zazhi* [Eastern Miscellanies]. The latter's editor-in-chief, Du Yaquan, in 1917, wrote "Boundaries between the Individual and the State", which echoed *Xin qingnian* in placing the individual before and above the state:

If you want the individual to devote himself to the national affairs, you first have to make him devote himself to his self. When he is devoted to his self, he does not need to elevate the state as its objective.

Du especially emphasized: individuals are responsible for the state, but before they fulfill their responsibility, they need to know their own position so as not to become subservient to the state.²² Ever since Yan Fu translated John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, many Chinese thinkers had become attentive to the relationship between the social aggregate [*qun*][†] at large and the self, and between the state and the individual. Whether one should give priority to the individual's emancipation or the building of the nation-state? Under the Influences of Spencer's social organism and Bluntschli's state organism theories, Yan Fu and Liang Qichao believed that the strength of the state depended on the quality of the citizenry and that there existed a closely intertwined and interactive relationship between these two. On the other hand, as Liang Shuming has pointed out, Chinese culture focused neither on the individual, nor on the social aggregate. Rather, accentuating the interpersonal, it was ethics- or relationship-centered.²³ Heavily shaped by this intellectual tradition of China, Yan Fu and Liang Qichao always cast the relationship between the individual and the

²¹ Gao Yihan 1915.

²² Du Yaquan 1917: 167.

²³ Liang Shuming 1990:79-95.

[†] Translator's note: *Qun* (lit. "group, grouping") was the most common word to denote the then novel notion of "society" in the 1890s. As the author explains later, it was later replaced by *shehui*, which derived from the Chinese script of Japanese *shakai* and has been a part of standard lexis of modern Chinese. *Qun*, however, differed from *shehui* in its lack of any connotation of being contradistinctive from the state. Furthermore, the ultimate community of *qun*, in the late Qing imagination, was the nation-state, which was both social and political. For an detailed analysis of the use of this term in Liang Qichao's writings at the turn of the twentieth century, see Hao Chang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 95-116, 156-158.

social aggregate in an interactive light. In the modern “group (con)forming” [*hequn de*] notion of citizenry, the relationship between the social aggregate and the self is not one of instrumental rationality, i.e. one between aim and means. Rather, they are in interactive and dialectic harmony. Yet, in the late Qing period, in the face of the threat of annihilation by the powers, to build the state, in comparison with the individual, was more important and urgent. This gave rise to the late Qing conception of the individual as the citizen, whose being was incorporated in the state. In contrast, the importance of the individual was seriously underscored during the May Fourth period. He was not only a citizen, being part of a collective, but also a self, being independent from the state with its own intrinsic purpose.²⁴ Although Du Yaquan followed the precedent set by Yan Fu and considered things in terms of the boundaries between the aggregate and the self, the state and the individual, he placed his emphasis on the individual and no longer on the state. The individual gained complete autonomy and no more took the state as its end. It also lost the uniformity as in the late Qing conception. This swerving in the imagined dynamics between the state and the individual was one of the most significant markers of the intellectual difference between the late Qing and the May Fourth period. It was also the consensus shared by the Enlightenment intellectuals associated with *Xin qingnian* and *Dongfang zazhi*.

During the May Fourth period, state instrumentalism was still a moderate theory. The most extreme were state idolism and state nihilism. Anarchism was the most popular theory. It was not only propagated by anarchists such as Wu Zhihui, Li Shizeng, and Liu Shipai, but was also an important element in the thoughts of Cai Yuanpei, Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, and Fu Sinian. The thinking of the Enlightenment intellectuals to varying degrees was all colored by a disdain for the state. Mao Dun recollected:

Back then, due to the disappointment with many movements, a deep misgiving about the state institute pervaded. So-called anarchism became very popular. Previously, everyone promoted patriotism. But now, (everyone) abandoned the state and the government.²⁵

Chen Duxiu, in his “On Iconoclasm” emotionally called for the destruction of all idols. In addition to the images of the gods and ghosts, the biggest idol was the state that had been erected by Yan Fu and Liang Qichao since the late Qing. Chen Duxiu scornfully stated: the state is an idol that only deceives. It has no real ability. If (we) remove its people, it would be nothing but a piece of land. This idol has been preserved only because the privileged class can use it to defend their prerogatives, and (those who have power) can use it to justify the invasion of the weak and small countries. He believed, “if the people of every country would gradually understand the truth about the Great Community of the world and the bliss of the true peace,

²⁴ For an analysis of the concept of individual during the May Fourth period, see Xu Jilin 2008.

²⁵ Shen Yanbing 1922.

then this kind of idol would be useless.” The purpose of smashing all idols was to establish new truth and belief. “If one does not destroy these fake idols,” such as the state, and the ghost and gods, “then the universal truth that we deeply believe would never be realized.”²⁶

In 1918, Liang Shuming’s father Liang Ji committed suicide for the demised Qing dynasty. The event roused the media’s attention and caused a big controversy. Sociologist Tao Menghe, in his “Composition for *Xin qingnian*,” argued that Liang Ji’s voluntary death was not worthwhile. According to him, “what is patriotism? What is the state that we love? The state is an abstract noun, which in itself consists of nothing that is worth of our love. What we love is the lives signified by this abstract noun. [...] The noun ‘patriotic heart’ is a catchphrase that has been used to deceive the people: the rulers used it to protect the royal family, the imperialists used it to protect their profits, and the power holders of the Republic use it to protect their own domination. Only (those who) fight for the happiness of the people can inspire patriotism. Otherwise, this noun is the most dangerous and harmful.”²⁷ Soon after the May Fourth Movement, Fu Sinian left China for England. Upon his departure, he announced in *Xin chao*.

I only admit that, on the large scale, mankind, and, on the small scale, “I” are real. All social identities between mankind and I, such as family and clan, locale, and the state, are idols. We have to cultivate our “true self” [zhenwo] for the sake of mankind.²⁸

Even this head architect of the May Fourth Movement, and leader of the student patriotic movement, considered the state as merely an illusionary idol and believed only in the identity of mankind and self. This would seem ridiculous in any self-claimed patriot. Yet, this was not an isolated case. Fu’s essay was quoted in a public lecture by Zhou Zuoren and was widely circulated at the time.²⁹ The May Fourth Movement was indeed a patriotic movement, but it was also more than a patriotic movement. Behind it, there was a grand idealism that inspired the hot-blooded youth of the May Fourth. This idealism was nothing but the then widespread cosmopolitanism.

The decline of statism and the growth of cosmopolitanism can be explained by the impact of the Great War on China. Since Yan Fu introduced European evolutionism, Chinese intellectuals in general accepted this new worldview centered on the theory of evolution, and believed that, due to China’s inferiority in material power, the West was stronger than China. Kang Youwei thereupon advocated “national salvation through material development,” and argued that Chinese civilization is inclined toward moral philosophy and lacks knowledge of the material

²⁶ Chen Duxiu 1918a.

²⁷ Tao Lü Gong 1919.

²⁸ Fu Sinian 1919c.

²⁹ See Zhou Zuoren 1996:76.

forces. “Considering China’s needs, (I) seek the quick remedy. In my view, the cause for China’s sickness and weakness lies nowhere other than in its negligence of material science.”³⁰ In the late Qing, other than statism, the most popular idea for saving the nation was through commerce and industry. Combining these two, one gets what Yang Du proposed, “the doctrines of gold and iron”: to build the nation internally through commercialization and industrialization, and externally through militarization. As such, “the doctrines of gold and iron” aimed to achieve the goal of wealth and power.³¹ However, the Great War’s eruption and its disastrous consequences awakened the Chinese intellectuals from the dream of materialism and statism. After the Great War, Liang Qichao traveled to Europe and discovered the land of abundance in the past had turned into a land of ruins. He deplored that “the material progress of the past hundred years was many times more than that of the previous three thousand years. Yet, we humans did not become happier. On the contrary, we brought about many catastrophes.”³² In Western civilization, there is a logic relationship between materialism and statism. Imperialism was founded on the base of state power. The opening remarks of the magazine *Xin qun*[New Group], an organ of the faculty of the China National Institute[*Zhongguo gongxue*], named statism the leading culprit, among all deceptive theories, in leading mankind astray. The author quoted Dewey and explained that statism was only Europe’s provisional policy to cope with religious wars. Yet, it was misunderstood as the principle of mankind’s public life, “hence caused this Great War of Europe.” The magazine called for “transcending the national boundaries,” and “stopping the blind mimicry of the doctrines of statism.”³³

In the treacherous environment of international competition, China could not afford to ignore statism. Yet, it was like a double-bladed sword, whose metamorphosis could lead to imperialism and harm the state itself. The Nationalist Party’s supreme theoretician Zhu Zhixin published his “Causes for Statism and its Mutations” in the magazine *Jianshe*[Construction] and discussed whether China should promote statism. He ended with this conclusion: In relation to individualism, statism was superior; yet it should be the means and cannot be taken as the permanent norm of life, because “statism is sometimes unhealthy, which is not only detrimental to the state, but also would harm human society.” Statism was necessary, but should not be the unquestionable doctrine. More important than statism was the “recently recognized ‘society of the whole mankind’,” i.e. cosmopolitanism.³⁴

Nevertheless, in the years immediately after the Great War, when the threats of imperial powers were still palpable, wasn’t it naive to thrust aside statism and advocate merely cosmopolitanism? Many intellectuals at the time raised this question. Liang Qichao admitted, “We need to know the time of Great Community of the

³⁰ Kang Youwei 1981:565.

³¹ See Yang Du 1986:226-227.

³² Liang Qichao 1918:2974.

³³ Liu Hongquan and Liu Hongze 1996:152-155.

³⁴ Zhu Zhixin 1979:346-347.

world is still far and the state for the time being remains necessary.” Still, he changed his earlier position of “a state of the world” and attempted to combine statism and cosmopolitanism. The aim was now “a state of cosmopolitanism”. This new statism differed from the past exaltation of the nation-state:

Our patriotism cannot concentrate on the state at the cost of individuals and cannot concentrate on the state at the cost of the world. We are dependent on our state to facilitate the development and expression of all individuals of the nation and thus to make timely contributions to the whole human civilization of this world.³⁵

Cosmopolitanism, to the Chinese intellectuals, meant the ideal of Great Community of the world, which can be traced back to the traditional Confucian view of all-under-heaven. According to our detailed analysis in the following pages, (the ideal) only took a different form in the modern era, namely, the theory of evolution through mutual aid. When Liang Qichao promoted a state of the world in the late Qing, he, under the influence of the Gongyang doctrine of Three Ages,[†] had treated the Great Community of the world as the highest level of human development in the future. Yet, “cosmopolitanism is an ideal and statism is a reality; cosmopolitanism belongs to the future and statism the present. China today faces a situation of immediate danger. This is not the time for us to discuss the future and the ideal. Therefore, I have to acknowledge my previous guilt of obstructing the nation’s development by indulging in abstract theories.”³⁶ Cosmopolitanism was wonderful but not suitable for the present world, where only the fittest would survive. There was still a need for “the state of the world”. Yang Du had a similar opinion. He similarly treated the “doctrine of gold and iron” as “a statism of the world.”³⁷ When the Great War revealed how hypocritical the “state of the world” was, those Chinese intellectuals deeply saturated in the Confucian thought of the Great Community soon changed their view and moved from the “statism of the world” to the “state of cosmopolitanism”. The difference between these two phrases cannot be exaggerated. “The world” in the former phrase was that of the struggle for existence, a jungle where the weak stood as the easy prey of the strong. In contrast, so-called “cosmopolitanism” was an ideal with (moral) value based on the Great Community

³⁵ Liang Qichao 1918:2978.

³⁶ Liang Qichao 1899:357.

³⁷ Yang Du 1986:225.

[†] Translator’s note: The Gongyang doctrine of the Three Ages was originally a hermeneutic tradition in Confucian Classical studies, which centered its exegetic focus on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* [*Chunqiu*]. Gongyang scholars maintained that Confucius had intended the Classics to be allegorical prophecies for postclassical history. They believed that the sage had predicted a three-stage scheme of historical development? society had to go through the Ages of Chaos and Transformation before reaching the Age of Great Peace. Kang Youwei, Liang’s teacher and collaborator, transformed the hermeneutic scheme into a plan of political reforms in the 1890s. The Age of Great Peace, in Kang’s vision, was a time of cosmopolitanism and the Great Community, when gender, racial, national, and cultural boundaries of earlier stages lose social and political significance and cease hindering the free communications and collaborations in human society.

and mutual aid among human beings. “The world” was physical with no value or ethical connotation. “Cosmopolitanism”, on the other hand, is humanistic, orientated toward universal values and the principle of justice.

This is the patriotism of the May Fourth period, a patriotism that is based on individualism and in pursuit of the progress of human civilization. The state, being positioned between the individual and humanity, was a necessary device (of self-defense) at the time of interstate competition. It constituted a meaningful identity only in alignment with the objectives of perfecting individual character and propelling human civilization. Liang Qichao, who used to be an enthusiastic promoter of statism, now believed “the state is not the highest association. Regardless of nationality, everyone should be aware of his/her membership in the whole human species and take responsibility for it. I cannot agree with the narrow-minded, biased, and out-dated patriotism.”³⁸ Fu Sinian explicitly stated: “we are in this world not merely members of the nation-state but also citizens of the world. According to our understanding of the modern times, the unification of the world still would use the nation as its unit. Our responsibility was therefore twofold: One is that of the state’s citizens and the other is that of the worlds’ citizens.”³⁹ The founder of the Young China Study Association [*Shaonian Zhongguo xuehui*], Wang Guangqi, when elaborating the intent of the organization, mentioned especially that “China should be treated as the name of a place [...] not a nation. I am a dreamer of the Great Community of the world. I viewed China the place as a portion of the world and wish to create the conditions for the Great Community of the world, and to do without national boundaries. Our efforts to enhance human happiness should not be limited to the borders of China.”⁴⁰

In the following pages, we will see that the concept of “a state of cosmopolitanism”, which emanated from the reflections over the Great War on the eve of the May Fourth Movement, transformed the patriotic movement from a protest against the Western powers to a movement about universal value of justice, transcending the narrow position of the nation and the state.

The Ideal of Cosmopolitanism, Universal Truth, and Great Community

During the May Fourth period, cosmopolitanism surpassed statism to become the “new tide” of the “new century”. This was not the conviction of certain individuals, such as Liang Qichao, Chen Duxiu, and Fu Sinian; this was a common intellectual phenomenon.

In 1919, on the eve of the May Fourth Movement, a group of patriotic students of Beijing University founded *Guomin zazhi* [National Magazine]. Cai Yuanpei, the chancellor, not only supported it with financial aid, but also composed a preface for it. He approved the patriotic sentiment but reminded the readers that in comparison with the state, cosmopolitanism was a higher standard.

³⁸ Liang Qichao 1919:3050.

³⁹ Fu Sinian 1920b:386.

⁴⁰ Wang Guangqi 1978:560.

The so-called nation, was also a part of humanity. Those who advocate absolute statism and ignore humanism should consider this: even a state as strong as Germany could not avoid being defeated, what would happen to others? I wish *Guomin zazhi* will not promote self-interested statism.⁴¹

Cai's advice influenced a whole generation of youth. Beijing University students of the May Fourth period took a wide perspective and saw the interest of mankind as of higher value than that of the state. At the beginning of 1920, the founding statement of *Beijing daxue xuesheng zhoukan*[Beijing University Student Weekly] specifically declared that "China is a unit of the world [...] We shall therefore clearly declare that 'we refuse anything that benefits the state but harms the world.'"⁴²

Zhejiang xin chao[New Tide of Zhejiang] magazine also announced in its initial remarks that the journal objects to statism and parochialism. People of Zhejiang "is part of the whole mankind. Due to our environment, we have to participate in the development of the whole of mankind through the development of a fraction of it."⁴³ This exemplifies how the youth of the May Fourth period were not limited in their vision to one nation and one region. Embracing cosmopolitanism, they devoted themselves to national salvation and social and cultural improvement with a concern for the whole of mankind.

The receding significance of the state opened up the opportunity for people to make direct connection between individualism and cosmopolitanism. Zhou Zuoren, who was famous for advocating a "literature of humanity" said, "literature belongs to mankind and individuals, but not to a race, a state, a region, and the family."⁴⁴ Like Fu Sinian, Zhou viewed all everything between mankind and individuals, from race, the state, to region, family and clan as illusionary idols. The individual and mankind became the only reality. The individual is a member of mankind, and mankind comprises many unique individuals. The relationship between these two was as between the "big ego" and the "small ego", a unique construct of the May Fourth period: the individual who takes care of only himself cannot testify to the meaning of life. The individual("small ego") completes oneself by living among mankind("large ego"). This construct of "large vs. small egos" originated from ancient China's intellectual tradition. Yet, the traditional "large ego" was the transcendental and moralistic cosmos (as in the Heavenly Mandate, Heavenly Way, or Heavenly Principle), and did not become the secular mankind and history until the May Fourth period. The individual's "small ego" has to merge into the historical evolution of mankind in order to realize itself. Hu Shi explained his view of life in these words:

The "small ego" of mine does not exist in isolation. It exists in direct and indirect relations with numerous other small egos and it interacts with and mutually

⁴¹ Cai Yuanpei 1978:393.

⁴² Zhonggongzhongyang maenliesizhuzhuobianyiju yanjiushi 1978(2/2):560.

⁴³ Zhonggongzhongyang maenliesizhuzhuobianyiju yanjiushi 1978(2/2):589.

⁴⁴ Zhou Zuoren 1996:73.

influences the totality of society and the world. It also has causal interrelationship with the past and future of society and the world [...] The totality of the various “small egos” of the past, the various “small egos” of the present, and the various “small ego” of the endless future, one generation after another, accumulatively, like a string that never breaks, like a stream that continuously flows, constitutes the “large ego”. The “small ego” would die, yet the “large ego” is everlasting without perishing [...] Therefore, all the endeavors, personalities, actions, expressions, ideals, contributions and faults of the “small egos” would last forever. This is the eternity of society, the eternity of the “large ego”.⁴⁵

The “large ego” of the human world is based on individuals (“small ego”) and it encourages the unchecked development of their personalities. Meanwhile, the world stood for a higher value to the individual; it regulates the development of their personalities. Zhou Zuoren promoted the “doctrine of the New Village”, and encouraged young people to form associations and communistic communities according to their own ideals. He wrote, “the human life in the ideal New Village is a world of one great commonalty with many small differences”; “it belongs to mankind but pays special attention to individuals.” Everyone, regardless of their regional and familial background, can develop his/her personality in the New Village, “as long as the small personality differences do not violate the great commonality of human nature.”⁴⁶ The individualism of the May Fourth period was not the post-modern attitude of anything goes. Behind individuality stood a universal understanding of human nature and the global value of the universal Great Community. This constituted the ideal world of “one great commonality with many small differences”: the small egos can express themselves freely; they nevertheless share with each other one and the same world, one and the same value, and one and the same “large ego”.

What did cosmopolitanism mean during the May Fourth period? After the Great War, the Chinese intellectuals and public opinion were both ecstatic. The most popular phrase was that “universal truth triumphed over power.” Europe was viewed as a place where the universal truth had the final victory. The May Fourth cosmopolitanism was not an empty phrase; it was undergirded by the universally accepted global value, i.e. the universal truth. Since the late Qing, Chinese nationalism had expressed itself along two different lines: the first followed the doctrine of universal truth and the other adulation of power. According to Wang Zhongjiang, Yan Fu represented the former, which believed that the struggle for survival and the natural selection not only entailed a competition in terms of wealth and power(force), but also the progress of civilization(intelligence and virtue). Liang Qichao stood for the other school, and upheld power to be the only goal of nationalism, the only basis for liberties and rights. Justice was always on the side of those who had power.⁴⁷ Liang in 1901 stated candidly:

⁴⁵ Hu Shi 1919:529-530.

⁴⁶ Zhou Zuoren 1996:79-80.

⁴⁷ See Wang Zhongjiang 2008:177-267.

Since the beginning of evolution, there has been struggle, which distinguished the superior from the inferior and the winner from the loser. The argument of those who had raw power might not be the universal truth but it worked as the universal truth. Nationalism, when reaching its extreme form, could not quench the nation's desire for maximizing its own interest, used its internal strength for expansion. Hence the saying: between two equals, the question of power is irrelevant; reason speaks in place of power. Between two unequals, however, reason is irrelevant; power speaks in place of reason.⁴⁸

The late Qing and early Republican craze of statism followed Liang Qichao's line of thought and exalted power, the wealth and power, and the militarist style of civil education. This kind of statism implied a nihilism about (moral) values and a disbelief in commonality between states, cultures and civilizations. There were no universal values in human society. Only state power, which does not speak for any (moral) values, counted. The clash of civilizations was thus a clash of forces, a showdown of material strength and power. The drawbacks of this view of absolute power started to show in the early Republican years. Domestically material forces and raw power were glorified; moral values were ignored. The only rule in society was that the weak is the prey of the strong. Du Yaquan bemoaned in pages of *Dongfang zazhi*:

In present society one sees only material forces and not spiritual forces [...] Everyone is infatuated with (the pursuit of) material forces. No one believes in gods of the divine world or the souls of the human world. Instead, they believe in the omnipresence of material forces. Furthermore, the cruel and cold theory of competition and elimination has also become popular [...] People do not care about the purpose of life and the aesthetics of the universe. To preserve oneself and to avoid elimination becomes the most urgent question in the world. As such, everyone cares about how to advance oneself and to push others into an inferior and losing position. Such a world has only competition but no ethics, has only contest but no morality.⁴⁹

Internationally the impact of the Great War on the Chinese has been discussed earlier. Under such circumstances, one important theme of the New Culture Movement of 1915 was to reexamine the fervor of statism since the late Qing and to criticize the moral nihilism behind the powers. Cosmopolitanism was popular at the time because it demanded the reestablishment of universal truth and reconfirmation of the universal values as the common basis for the order in China and the world.

Late Qing nationalism interpreted universal truth, replacing the Heavenly Principle as the centerpiece of the new worldview, in terms of the evolution through the struggle for existence, in which species compete in natural selection and the

⁴⁸ Liang Qichao 1901a:459.

⁴⁹ Du Yaquan 2003:36-37.

superior win over the inferior. In the May Fourth period, the universal truth was given a new meaning and linked to the values of the Enlightenment. What is the universal truth? According to Chen Duxiu in the pages of *Meizhou pinglun* [Weekly Review], it was to abide by quality and freedom.⁵⁰

Seeing the victory of the Great War as the moment that universal truth triumphed over the power, Chinese intellectuals no longer believed in the late Qing exaltation of raw power, and began to reestablish universal truth as the yardstick for order and legitimacy. The difference between China and the Western states was no longer one of raw power and strength; it was a difference in the level of civilization. The establishment of a culture and institution based on equality and freedom was the key. The New Culture Movement spread this view of Enlightenment values and deeply impressed it upon the minds of the patriotic students. When students in Beijing took to the streets on May Fourth and gathered in Tiananmen Square, they supported not the narrow interests of the state but the realization of universal truth. They resisted the foreign powers not for the interests of the nation, but for the global values of universality. The “Statement of Students in Beijing” stated:

When the peace conference convened, we hoped for and celebrated nothing but the existence of justice, humanity, and universal truth in the world. The return of Qingdao, and the cancellation of the secret accords, military agreements between China and Japan, and other unequal treaties are based on the principle of truth and justice. Violating the universal truth and indulging in the excessiveness of power, transferring our national territory to the supervision of five (foreign) states, and treating us like the defeated Germany and Austria, has violated the universal standards of truth and justice.⁵¹

The powers’ belligerence and selfishness, manifested in the Paris Peace Conference, deeply disappointed Chen Duxiu and convinced him that power had actually triumphed over universal truth. He no longer believed in Wilson as the nice defender of universal truth in the world. Yet, Chen did not return reversely to the late Qing position of exalting raw power and of moral nihilism. He gave up the illusion that the Western powers would carry out universal truth, but he did not give up on truth itself. From the failure of the Paris Peace Conference, he learned that, in order to avoid another world war where the weak become the prey of the strong, “to change human thinking and fundamentally eliminate the powers that lie is the only way.”⁵² At the same time, he gave up the past illusion that reason could be achieved through non-violent and non-resistant means and advocated “defending universal truth with strong power”:

We do not advocate using power to override universal truth, but have no choice but to advocate using power to defend the universal truth. We do not promote

⁵⁰ Chen Duxiu 1918b.

⁵¹ Quoted from Li Xin and Chen Tiejian 1983:42-43.

⁵² Chen Duxiu 1919d:8.

using power to oppress other people, but have not choice but to promote using power to resist oppression.⁵³

Chen Duxiu's new maxim of "using power to defend truth" was a further development of Yang Du's thinking. Yang observed in the late Qing that "What China deals with today are civilized states. What China finds itself in today is a barbaric world." Because of this contradiction between the internal and external policies of the Western countries, "there are civilized states but this is no civilized world. Every state is civil domestically, and barbaric internationally. It follows reason domestically but focuses on power internationally. Therefore, in terms of the state itself, it is civilized. From the perspective of the world, this is a barbaric world. How can we prove this? We only need to see the difference between international law and domestic law." To resist the civilized powers, a double strategy was necessary. Yang proposed: "Dealing the civilized states requires China to be civilized. Being in the barbaric world requires China to be barbaric."⁵⁴ Yang's dual strategy that divides civilization and barbarism along the line of domestic and international gives no priority to either. Different from Yang, Chen Duxiu, who deeply believed in Enlightenment values, still held the value of universal truth and liberty and freedom as the ultimate objective, even after his disillusionment with the Paris Peace Conference. Power itself could not be the aim; it was merely the means for realizing truth. Soon later, Fei Juetian wrote a piece in *Guomin ribao* and echoed Chen's line of "using power to defend universal truth." He advocated "reaching cosmopolitanism by means of statism," "destroying militarism and eradicating the powers are the means through which the Great Community can be realized."⁵⁵ This post-May Fourth statism that aimed at cosmopolitanism differed from the late Qing "station of the world". In spite of the realistic awareness of the world being a jungle where power dominated, it still held onto the final ideal of universal truth and the Great Community. Statism was no more the objective in itself; it was the strategic means for the realization of truth.

In the period during which the patriotic protests against the powers' decision at the Peace Conference reached new heights everyday, Chen Duxiu released "Should we Love our State?" in *Meizhou pinglun* and furthered his argument from "Patriotism and Self-Awareness" of five years ago. He reminded his compatriots that patriotism should not be blind and unconditional. It should ground itself on rationality.

Before we ask whether we should love our state, we should ask what the state is [...] What we love is the state where all people use their patriotism to resist oppression, not the government using patriotism to oppress other states. We love the state where people's happiness is valued, not the state who forces the people to sacrifice for it.⁵⁶

⁵³ Chen Duxiu 1919e:18-19.

⁵⁴ Yang Du 1986:217-235.

⁵⁵ Fei Juetian 1919.

⁵⁶ Chen Duxiu 1919e:22-24.

This “rational patriotism” of Chen Duxiu held fast to rationality, which was the universal truth of equality and freedom. May Fourth was a romantic time of idealism. Intellectuals experienced frustrations but still upheld truth, the soul of the era: the ideal of the Great Community of the world.

In his speech upon the celebration of the Allies’ victory in Tiananmen Square, Cai Yuanpei claimed that the victory of the Great War marked “the end of the dark theory of raw power and the beginning of the constructive theory of *mutual aid*, the end of the dark racism and the development of the doctrine of the Great Community.”⁵⁷ Witnessing the unfolding of this bright world of Great Community, the May Fourth intellectuals were extraordinarily excited. They optimistically believed that a “new era”, “new time”, and “new tide” had arrived. On the New Year of 1919, Li Dazhao ardently declared the advent of a new era: the blood from the Great War, from the Russian Revolution, and from the German and Austrian Revolution, “resulted in a new era, which brings about new life, new civilization, and new world. We will from now on know that the principle of the prevalence of the superior over the inferior and that of the weak being the prey of the strong are overturned. Biological evolution relied not on competition but on mutual aid. If people want to survive and be happy, then they should love each other and should not rely on power to brutalize each other.”⁵⁸ All of sudden, the relatively unknown *Mutual Aid* of Kropotkin became a bestseller. The ancient Confucian ideal of the Great Community of the world, through the catalysis of the evolutionary theory of mutual aid, became the modern utopia of cosmopolitanism. The May Fourth intellectuals still envisioned a world of evolutionism. Yet, in comparison with the late Qing and early Republican times, they now valued mutual aid, rather than competition, and morality and spirituality, rather than gold and iron, as the propelling force of evolution. The ideal of Great Community became once again legitimate in the modern world. Liang Chichao called out with passion: “We Chinese never took the state as the highest organization of mankind. We thought there must exist an even higher organization over all states, i.e. that of the all-under-heaven [...] This open-minded cosmopolitanism constituted the core of our political view for thousands of years.”⁵⁹ In addition to the theory of mutual aid, even democracy, the most discussed subject at the time, was given the meaning of the Great Community of the world. Li Dazhao advised the youth: “our sacred youth should know the democracy of today is not simply an organization of any single state. It was the organization of the world. Democracy is not simply a point in the history of human life; it was the whole trajectory of human development towards the Great Community of the world.”⁶⁰ All aspirations of the May Fourth times, such as freedom, equality, democracy, and justice, lead to the same end, which was the highest ideal of the Great Community of the world.

⁵⁷ Cai Yuanpei 1918:53-55.

⁵⁸ Li Dazhao 1919a:128.

⁵⁹ Liang Qichao 2005:743-744.

⁶⁰ Li Dazhao 1919b:131.

The advent of the “new era” set intellectuals dreaming about the future according to their respective understanding of “new civilization” and “new tide”. Zhang Dongsun yearned for “the third civilization.” He labeled the ancient civilization as one of religions, modern civilization as “that of individualism and statism”. The Great War exposed the large problem of the civilization of the second kind. Therefore, the third civilization would arise in its place. This was “the civilization of socialism and cosmopolitanism.”⁶¹ When the news of the Russian Revolution reached China, those intellectuals who yearned for “a new civilization” applauded. Many beautiful misinterpretations based on endless imaginations ensued. Future Marxists, anarchists and social-democrats all viewed the Russian Revolution as the birth of a new civilization. The idealistic and romantic Li Dazhao, when comparing the Russian Revolution with the French Revolution, designated the latter as a revolution of statism and the former one of cosmopolitanism.

The French spirit of then was patriotism. The Russian spirit of today is the love for mankind. The former was rooted in statism, while the latter is inclined toward cosmopolitanism. The former gave rise to war, while the latter will bring peace. Such are the differences.⁶²

After the twentieth-century China suffered so much from revolutionary utopianism that reexamination and criticism of utopia has become the mainstream among intellectuals since the turn of the twentieth-first century. Although we admit that the revolutionary utopianism (of the past century) stemmed from the May Fourth sentiments of idealism and romanticism, we have to make a distinction. The revolutionary utopia of “proletarian dictatorship”, a cruel and brutal mutation, was radically different from the May Fourth utopia of cosmopolitanism. The latter opposed the despotic rule of iron and blood, transcended the narrow goal of statism, and suggested a global value that various races, states, and peoples could all aspire to. Kant’s vision of “eternal peace in the world” was a utopia of cosmopolitanism of his time, which inspired John Rawls, the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century, to put forward a “realistic utopianism” that aims for the global justice through a universal law. With the rise of nationalism and statism in the modern era, human society needs cosmopolitan utopianism to maintain justice in the globe and to check the conflicts and tensions resulting from the overdevelopment of statism. Utopianism is a universal value in the globe and the common law that human society relies on for existence and development. The May Fourth intellectuals of cosmopolitan and romantic sentiment had a broad vision, not limited to one state and one people. Their aspiration was “a state of cosmopolitanism”, a rise of the nation that was based on the global value of universalism. This is the May Fourth Movement of patriotism, a patriotism of cosmopolitan ideal.

⁶¹ Zhang Dongsun 1919.

⁶² Li Dazhao 1918:56.

“To Create Society from Scratch”

The May Fourth Movement was provoked by the peace conference of Paris, an event of fortuity. Yet, as a mass movement, it had a long process of fermentation. After the Republic was founded, people experienced a short period of bliss but were soon dismayed by the restoration of the imperial system, the corruption of legislators, the split between north and south, and the messy infighting among the warlords. Intellectuals in general were apathetic towards politics and depressed about the future of their country. The end of the Great War was a turning point in popular sentiment. To celebrate the victory of the Allies, schools in Beijing suspended classes for three days. Students gathered in Tiananmen Square. Radically diverging from the earlier mood of despair, the crowd was excited and cheerful. Cai Yuanpei, the chancellor of Beijing University at the time, had repeatedly emphasized that “university is a place where one immerses oneself in profound knowledge,”⁶³ and that “university is purely an organization of research.”⁶⁴ Yet, he, in 1918, called upon students to march out of campus and fulfill their responsibility to society. “School is a small social aggregate, which could not position itself outside the larger aggregate, namely, the state, and the largest aggregate, the world.”⁶⁵ Hu Shi later recollected, “now I think back, we at that time were ‘using others’ wine glasses to quell the sad mood in our own hearts’. We were all dissatisfied with China’s political situation and the international affairs and all wished for a change, an opportunity to reform the current situation.”⁶⁶

Other than the Great War, the March First Independence Movement in Korea was another stimulus. Chen Duxiu said in *Meizhou pinglun*, “this independence movement in Korea is great, sincere, and courageous. They have correct notions, and use the people’s will instead of violence. They have ushered in a new era in the world history of revolution.”⁶⁷ What caught Chen Duxiu’s attention was not the independence itself but the style of the movement, which was a social movement of mass mobilization and non-violence. Echoing Chen, Fu Sinian summarized the meanings of the March First Movement into three points: “A revolution of non-violence”, “a revolution striving for the impossible”, and “a revolution of nobody but students.”⁶⁸ Fu, like Chen, also praised the non-violent methods of the March First Movement, and paid special attention to Korean students’ leadership in the movement. All these indicate that the stagnancy in Chinese society of the early Republican years was being melted by the Great War and by the March First Movement. People were listless for change, awaiting the proper opportunity (for action).

The May Fourth Movement incited by the failure of the Peace Conference started with a student movement and became a social movement of all citizens after June Third. The movement started in Beijing but won its final victory in Shanghai.

⁶³ Cai Yuanpei 1917:295.

⁶⁴ Cai Yuanpei 1907a:166.

⁶⁵ Cai Yuanpei 1907b:175.

⁶⁶ Hu Shi 1935.

⁶⁷ Chen Duxiu 1919a:509.

⁶⁸ Fu Sinian 1919b:215-216.

The process is meaningful. Beijing was the center of the public sphere, with intellectuals as its leaders, and Shanghai was the stronghold of the civil society, as indicated by the strong position of the middle class. Social movements of modern China often began with the intellectuals, and then the various social actors followed suit. Pure student movements, such as the movement of December Ninth(1935), often had no direct social impact. Simple civil movements, such as the many movements to resist foreign goods, were usually utilitarian, short, and unable to have transcendent meaning in history. The May Fourth set an example for modern China's non-violent social movements. Although it was initially a patriot movement, it had the color of a social movement. A movement "to fight for sovereignty internationally" could often be used by the government and political parties. A social movement "to remove national traitors" was usually grounded in civil society, clearly delimited from the government. It relied on the mobilization of the media and wide social forces to pressure the government and to achieve the goals of social reform.

Upon the anniversary of the May Fourth, Chen Duxiu gave a speech at China National Institute on "What is the Spirit of the May Fourth Movement?" According to Chen, although the May Fourth Movement was a patriotic movement, it had a unique spirit, which could be summarized as "direct action" and "the spirit of (self-)sacrifice."⁶⁹ Chen, who was later acclaimed by Mao Zedong as the "head commander of the May Fourth Movement," was of the same opinion as Fu Sinian and Luo Jialun. For them, the spirit of the May Fourth Movement went beyond patriotism and national salvation. More important was its social energy. Independent from political parties and government, various realms of society took the initiative in civic responsibility.

Chen's assessment of the May Fourth Movement has much to do with his long-term observations and expectations of the political situation. Republican politics had become by and large the parties' politics and the warlords' politics, irrelevant to most citizens. Political apathy was the norm in society. Even intellectuals were utilitarian and cynical. In early 1916, Chen had deplored that "there have been movements of the political parties, but no movement of citizens in recent politics." Chen hoped the Chinese youth could be "strong and powerful citizens and transform the parties' movements into the citizens' movements, like their counterparts in the French Revolution."⁷⁰ The New Culture Movement called for the "final ethical awareness", and was meant to awaken in the youth their civic consciousness and sense of responsibility for the world. When the Great War ended, Chen hopefully expected Wilson to speak for universal truth and curtailed other powers. He became deeply disappointed when hearing of the failure of the Paris conference and the peace talks between the North and South. His comment in *Meizhou pinglun* was titled "Both Peace Conferences are Useless," which stated that "these two conferences of booty sharing have turned their backs on the true happiness of mankind and the eternal peace of the world. People all over the world have to stand up to take things

⁶⁹ Chen Duxiu 1920:130.

⁷⁰ Chen Duxiu 1916a.

into their own hands.”⁷¹ Incidentally, Chen’s comment was made on May Fourth, 1919. On this day, students in Beijing indeed “stood up to take things to their own hands.” Chinese society of the early Republic, was politically dark and fragmented, but the Beiyang government was too busy with infighting to implement social control. The student movement provided an outlet to the energy of civil society centered on Shanghai, which had been fermenting for a long while, and brought it to bear on the government’s political decision. As Luo Jialun stated, “before the May Fourth, China felt like it was on its death bed; after the May Fourth, China is back to its naïve and energetic youth. The May Fourth injected new energy into China. This is its principal achievement.”⁷²

In the early years of the Republic, politicians’ gaze was fixed at the top. All discussions and propositions, such as on the choice between centralism and federalism, between presidentialism and parliamentarism, remained within the political circle, with no input from the social and cultural circles. The victory of the May Fourth Movement made China’s political parties, from Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party to Liang Qichao’s Research Clique, discover the internal energy of new ideas, young students, and civil society. As their gaze started to move downward, they started to pay attention to propaganda and mass mobilization, especially to win the support of young students. The Nationalist Party’s Nationalist Revolution that began in early 1925, was able to march northward and unify China smoothly because they learned from the May Fourth Movement and placed emphasis on propaganda and mass mobilization.

Other than political parties, the Enlightenment intellectuals who led the May Fourth Movement were even more animated by the victory. Fu Sinian declared excitedly:

We can say the May Fourth Movement was a rediscovery of the sense of social responsibility. In the past couple months, amongst the political darkness and heaviness, we found lively social movement. This is all due to the rediscovery of the awareness of social responsibility [...] After May Fourth, China finally has “society”.⁷³

The May Fourth intellectuals having had a taste of social movement, started to shift their focus from individual emancipation to social reform and to a social movement that involved the citizens widely. Therefore, the high tide of the May Fourth Movement was not patriotism and national salvation. Instead, it was the lively social movement. Social reform became the most popular keyword. Just like the comment by a contemporary, “Society! Society! Such is the most current catchword.”⁷⁴ Nearly a hundred new journals were founded soon after the May Fourth Movement

⁷¹ Chen Duxiu 1919c.

⁷² Luo Jialun 1919b.

⁷³ Fu Sinian 1919e:355.

⁷⁴ Tao Lügong 1917.

and most of them purported to reform society. From their founding statements, one gains a glimpse. Initial remarks of *Zhejiang xin chao* claimed, “social reform is the goal of our journal.”⁷⁵ *Xin Jiangxi*[New Jiangxi] declared: we believe in social reform, and “the founding of this journal is a method of social reform.”⁷⁶ *Beida xuesheng zhoukan*[Student Weekly of Beijing University]: “our objective is to create a newer, more beautiful, better and more reasonable social institution. With such aspiration for the better, newer, more beautiful, and more reasonable, (we strive for) the best, the most beautiful, the newest, and the most reasonable social institutions.”⁷⁷ *Duanfeng*[Wind of Rectitude] averred, “the peace of the state and of the world in hinged upon society.”⁷⁸

Creation of society became the main aspiration after the May Fourth Movement. Fu Sinian wrote, “to create a well-organized society from scratch shall be the youth’s number one project.”⁷⁹ This aspiration did not start from the May Fourth. In the late Qing, Yan Fu and Liang Qichao had taken the question of creating social aggregate seriously. The ideas of “social aggregate”[*qun*] and “society”[*shehui*] had some historical continuity in modern China; the latter was derived from the former, but they differed quite significantly. *Qun* of the late Qing included the traditional guild, clan, and regional associations as well as the modern chambers of commerce, study groups, and all kinds of social and political groups of a nation. The central idea of Liang Qichao’s *New Citizen* was to build a “group (con)forming” China revolving around the benefits of various groups.⁸⁰ “Group” in Liang’s thought was a multilayered public network comprising various civic aggregates. “I first try to self-govern my own life. I then unite my life with other lives into a small group and try self-governing therein. I then unite these groups into a large group and try self-governing therein. And I then unite large groups into an even larger group and try self-governing therein. At the end, a completely holy nation of freedom, equality, independence, and autonomy was born.”⁸¹ The continuum from oneself to family, to society and then to the state and the world followed the pattern of Confucian tradition. In Liang’s trajectory of group development, family, society, the state and the world were one. Among these various levels of grouping, the state was the most important. In the late Qing, because the state and society were both newly distinguished from the traditional notion of collectivity, and did not become mutually differentiated, they remained distinct layers of the same modern group. Like Wang Hui has pointed out, in Liang Qichao’s thought, “group” was both the modern

⁷⁵ “*Zhejiang xin chao fakanci*” in Zhonggongzhongyang maenliesizhuzuo bianyijiu yanjiushi, ed. 1978(2/2):587.

⁷⁶ “*Xin Jiangxi xuanyan*” in Zhonggongzhongyang maenliesizhuzuo bianyijiu yanjiushi, ed. 1978(3/2):447.

⁷⁷ “*Beijing daxue xuesheng zhoukan fakanci*” in Zhonggongzhongyang maenliesizhuzuo bianyijiu yanjiushi, ed. 1978(2/2):559.

⁷⁸ “*Duan feng fakanci*” in Liu Hongquan and Liu Hongze, eds. 1996:99.

⁷⁹ Fu Sinian 1920b:385.

⁸⁰ Liang Qichao 1902:662, 694.

⁸¹ Liang Qichao 1902:683.

nation-state, and a highly autonomous civil society.⁸² Society and the state, rather than in contention with each other, formed an actively interconnected network of public aggregates.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, “society” [*shehui*], after being introduced from Japan, and slowly having replaced the term *qun*, became the new concept in vogue.⁸³ In comparison with *qun*, the concept of society was clearly distinct from traditional notion of groupings, such as family and the state. It signified the civic realm between family and the state. An essay that discussed rights in 1901 differentiated society clearly from family and the state. “Because people cannot act in isolation, they rely on the support from family, society, and the state. Family, society and the state, however, are nothing but the aggregations of people.”⁸⁴ In 1903, an essay “A New Theory on Society” appeared in *Zhejiang chao* and argued that society formed the basis of the state. “A healthy state indicates therefore a healthy society. And a feeble society can absolutely not produce a healthy state.”⁸⁵

This society, being apart from the state, found its expression in the late Qing and early Republican period through the public domain of the gentry class.⁸⁶ In traditional China, the Confucian gentry mediated between the imperial center and local society. They were the bureaucrats assisting the emperor, and the elite leaders in local communities. The Ming-Qing despotism greatly suppressed their activities. Yet, they regained prominence after rising to the occasion by crushing the Taiping rebellion. The social base of this gentry class lay first in blood relations, regional associations, and mutual trusts, and secondly in urban associations of merchants, social groups, schools and newspaper enterprises. They had deep connections with the court. At the same time, they were often differentiated from the state, and started to establish a public domain of their own, a unique development in China.⁸⁷ In the late Qing, the gentry expanded their prerogatives in the name of promoting people’s rights. They demanded the rights of political participation by launching a constitutional movement and demanded a higher level of regional autonomy under the New Policy reforms. The 1911 revolution, like Joseph Esherick has argued, was double-faced: it was democratic and republican, and characterized by the “feudal” nature of the gentry class. Both saw the centralization of government as the enemy.⁸⁸ After the revolution, the power structure was maintained by a coalition of the military and the gentry.⁸⁹ The power of the gentry class reached unprecedented heights. Their deep involvement at the power center of politics made them corrupt and ruined

⁸² On the idea of *qun* and its nature as a self-governing civil society in Liang Qichao’s thought, see Wang Hui 2004:ch.9.

⁸³ On the change from *qun* to *shehui*, Jin Guantao, Liu Qingfeng, and Wang Fansen have detained analyses. See Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 2008:175-220; Wang Fansen 1997.

⁸⁴ “Quanli pian” by unknown author in Zhang Dan 1960:480.

⁸⁵ Da Wo 1960:509.

⁸⁶ On the gentry’s public sphere in the late Qing and early Republic, see Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 2008.

⁸⁷ On the public sphere in modern China, see Xu Jilin 2003.

⁸⁸ Esherick 1982:10.

⁸⁹ Chen Zhirang 1981.

their reputation. They were no longer deemed as the proper leaders of society. Thus, a new generation of intellectuals rose to replace them and took over the leadership of society. Accompanying this change was the enlargement of the public domain, hitherto dominated by the gentry, to include the whole society. The May Fourth Movement signified a new paradigm: the Enlightenment intellectuals and young students lead a social movement that all classes of society participated in.

From the perspective of the May Fourth intellectuals, China's masses were like a tray of loose sand. Society in its modern sense was non-existent in China. Fu Sinian therefore proposed that "to create a well-organized society from scratch shall be the youth's number one project."⁹⁰ Drawing on the gentry's traditional social base, such as clans and regional and religious communities, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao of the late Qing modeled their vision of regional autonomy on the self-sufficient communities of the post-Ming rural China. Their vision, in the final analysis, amounted to an expansion of the gentry's prerogatives. Some at the time, however, had noticed how the traditional patrimonial community differed from the modern community of civil society.

Our country has always been a patrimonial society, not a society of civic institutions. Therefore, there are many precedents of self-governing by the patrimonial institutions and no example of self-governing by cities and townships. Some thus have commented on how greatly the patrimonial structure obstructed human evolution.⁹¹

Both the patrimonial community and the civic community were characterized by their ability to self-govern. Yet, since Yan Fu translated Edward Jenks' *History of Politics*(1904), the intellectual world of China had widely accepted the three-stage theory of human development, i.e. from "savage" to "patrimonial" and finally to "the state"(the "political" society). The traditional clannish community of self-governing, the product of the patrimonial society, was thus considered an obstruction of history's forward movement. China needed to develop a self-governing civic community and to move into the stage of political society. At the time of the May Fourth, the Enlightenment intellectuals further treated the traditional clannish community as the social foundation of feudal despotism. Wu Yu thought that the Chinese system of clanship was the root of despotism. "Our country has been trapped in a society of patrimonial rule, and can not move on. This is due to the obstruction of the institute of clanship."⁹²

During the May Fourth period, Fu Sinian had a particularly profound analysis. He sharply noted that political despotism was the cause of the non-existence of modern society in China. Europe and Japan, during their medieval times, had the system of feudal lords. "Feudalism was not a good system. Still the

⁹⁰ Fu Sinian 1920b:385.

⁹¹ Ha Xiao 1960:9.

⁹² Wu Yu 1917.

spirit of self-governing was present within small groups therein.” China’s political system of centralism and despotism “turned clay into sand of the desert, turned organisms into machines, and turned the growth of society into the training of cattle [...] Under despotism there were only individuals. Nothing is worth the name of public.”⁹³ Fu Sinian published the essay, “Chinese Dogs and Chinese People”, in *Xin qingnian*. According to Fu, trainers at Beijing’s school of policy dogs claimed that the Chinese dogs were smarter and swifter than the Western dogs, but they had no sense of responsibility. On duty, they were often distracted from their tasks at hand by dogs of the opposite sex and by food. Fu lamented after learning about this: “How come Chinese dogs are so similar to Chinese people? They are smart, but they lack a sense of responsibility.” It all stemmed from despotism.

Under despotism, there is no responsibility to speak about. After long, this has become inherited [...] Ruled by despotism, the Chinese people are like loose sand. It is very different from the West, where even in the era of aristocracy, the middle class still enjoyed certain organizations, some life, and thus some sense of responsibility.⁹⁴

Fu further distinguished two kinds of order. One is “order (imposed) on society,” and the other is “order (emerged) within society.” In China, the masses were like a tray of loose sand; the organic relationship of a society was missing; integration thus hung on the external authority of political despotism. This was so-called “order (imposed) on society.” In contrast, there was an “order (emerged) within society” in the West. There were independent, free, and decent individuals. These individuals, through all kinds of voluntary organizations, established an organic society and formed an autonomous order within society, which could resist despotic government.⁹⁵ Being used to despotic government and its leadership, the Chinese had the mentality of worshipping the power that be. “They always hope certain big figures will step up and devote themselves to the transformation of society, as if transformation can be done mechanically.”⁹⁶ The failure of the parliamentary politics of the early Republic made the May Fourth intellectuals loathe all politics. They believed no more that political figures could solve any problem and that political forces could achieve anything. They instead placed their hope in society itself, in society’s self-awareness after the masses were mobilized by the intellectuals. Fu even rabidly linked politics with despotism.

Any belief in top-down reform, that is, using political forces for reform, is inevitably colored by despotism. All those who believed in bottom-up reform

⁹³ Fu Sinian 1919e:348.

⁹⁴ Fu Sinian 1919d.

⁹⁵ Fu Sinian 1919a:151-152.

⁹⁶ Fu Sinian 1919e:348-349.

would improve politics through nurturing society. Only the latter can be counted as the fundamental awakening.⁹⁷

This opinion was tinted by anarchism. In fact, during the May Fourth period, anarchism was the most prominent theory. From Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, to Hu Shi, Fu Sinian, to varying degrees, were all influenced by the trend of anarchism. They viewed the state as an invented idol, a vehicle used by the despotic authorities to oppress the people. In sharp contrast to the blind belief in political forces in the early Republic, May Fourth intellectuals shifted the focus of their endeavors from the top-down to the bottom-up. They intended to establish an autonomous and organized society other than the state, using this society to nurture independent individuals and to bring under control the undependable politics. How should an organized society be established? According to Fu,

To create this so-called organized society entails first the cultivation of “a sense of responsibility in society,” and, second, “the cohesion among individuals,” through the cultivation of affection, acumen, and responsibility toward the public.⁹⁸

The sense of individual responsibility was the modern civic consciousness, the individual’s “small ego” taking responsibility for the collective “large ego” of mankind. The meaning of individual life could only be realized by committing oneself to the social enterprise. Fu therefore repeatedly emphasized individual reforms as the premise of social reforms. The stormy mass movement could not solve China’s problem. “Self-reform was the first step of social reform,”⁹⁹ which started with nurturing the civic virtue of self-sacrifice through building strong character and knowledge, and ended with connecting alienated individuals into foundational networks of organic relationships and social organizations. China would thereby have a base to resist this dysfunctional government.

It is remarkable that the social consciousness of the May Fourth intellectuals was based on deep cosmopolitanism rather than narrow nationalism. Fu Sinian stressed: the state was the subject that joined the world in the past, but now society replaced the state and became the subject. Society is not limited to one nation, and one country. It aspires to self-improvement by following the social trend in the world. (Individuals) would join the world through society.¹⁰⁰ The May Fourth cosmopolitanism had very variegated sources, just like its complicated ideal of “new society”. Both liberal individualism and utopian socialism were important inspirations, and they were not clearly differentiated from each other at the time. Various doctrines, albeit in tension with each other, were the common stock of values and ideals for the May Fourth intellectuals, peacefully coexisting in the

⁹⁷ Fu Sinian 1919e:349.

⁹⁸ Fu Sinian 1920b:386.

⁹⁹ Fu Sinian 1920a:382-383.

¹⁰⁰ Fu Sinian 1919e:354-355.

intellectuals' thoughts. Hu Shi, Fu Sinian and those who later became liberals admired the Russian Revolution and celebrated the eruption of social revolution as enthusiastically as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. The future leaders of the Communist Party, such as Li and Chen, also applauded individuality; in their imagination, the "new society" of the future would be a beautiful new world where everyone's freedom is respected and fully actualized.

However, social movement was not cultural movement. New Culture Movement could simply import theories and tolerate diversity, but a social movement needed mass mobilization and the propagation of ideas. The latter needed clear doctrines and identifiable ideology. From this perspective, the unification of positions among the May Fourth intellectuals could not last long. The May Fourth Movement, after turning into a social movement, would inevitably become more ideology-driven and more political. The Young China Study Association was a youth group that had the biggest membership, the widest scope, and the most far-reaching influence at the time. They gathered together for the ideal of "thought reform and life improvement," but soon splintered into various factions, each following different doctrines of statism, socialism, and anarchism. They bickered endlessly over whether doctrines are necessary and which is worthier. Finally the split in ideology led this once influential group to disintegration. Hu Shi, in his recollection on the May Fourth Movement, deplored how the New Culture Movement was politicized because all political forces noticed the energy of the intellectuals and students. At the end, intellectuals rekindled their interest in politics, the cultural movement changed into a social movement and then mutated into a political movement.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, the political enthusiasm of the May Fourth intellectuals was apparently different from that of the gentry in the early Republic. The latter's politics was the party politics of the privileged class, being driven by group interests and strategization and lacking any clear ideological commitment. The post-1922 fervor for politics, having emerged from the New Cultural Movement, had a distinctive doctrinal commitment and was fueled by specific ideology. The early Republic's political infighting did not touch society at large. But after 1922, in the wake of the upheaval of the May Fourth Movement and the continuous social movements, all social classes became dissatisfied with the warlord rule and the Beiyang government. Various social forces were mobilized. The catalyzing effects of both ideology and social movement paved the way for the Nationalist Revolution.

Like the May Fourth Movement, the Nationalist Revolution had its catalyst, which was nothing other than the consciousness of nationalism, being suppressed by the cosmopolitanism of the May Fourth period. In fact, during the late May Fourth period, people started to become disillusioned with the idea of cosmopolitan utopia and were again attracted to nationalism. "The state of cosmopolitanism," once the mainstream, lost its appeal and was replaced again by nationalism, this time a new type that concentrated on resistance and whose main plea was anti-

¹⁰¹ Tang Degang, ed. 1981:193-194.

¹⁰² Sun Zhongshan 1981:650-654.

imperialism. Sun Yat-sen, making the most of the help of the Comintern and the first united front, re-appropriated the discourse of nationalism. He strongly criticized the cosmopolitanism popular during the May Fourth period, equated it to ancient China's doctrine of all under heaven, and argued that the Manchu conquest was made possible by the cosmopolitanism popular among the educated in the late Ming. As such, Sun suggested that cosmopolitanism would destroy the country and the nation.¹⁰² Sun's nationalism was deeply characterized by ideas of ethnic identity and national culture, representing a rupture with his much advocated doctrine of people's rights. Yet, this ethnic and essentialist nationalism catered to the new political wave. The Nationalist Revolution needed a clearly defined target and program. This nationalism concentrating on resistance provided an ideological platform where all classes with political enthusiasm could meet. The May Thirtieth incident in 1925, like the breakdown of the peace conference in Paris, ignited a historical event, the Nationalist Revolution, in Chinese history.

Thus ended the May Fourth. A new era of nationalism ensued. Patriotism, irrepressible like an unbridled horse, exploded with the foremost strength, bringing the first half of the twentieth century's history of China to its end.

GLOSSARY

aiguo zhuyi	愛國主義	Ming	明
Beijing	北京	minzu zhuyi	民族主義
Beiyang	北洋	Qing	清
Chunqiu	春秋	Qingdao	青島
datong	大同	qun	群
gongli	公理	Shanghai	上海
Gongyang	公羊	Shaonian Zhongguo xuehui	少年中國學會
guojia	國家	shehui	社會
guojia zhuyi	國家主義	Taiping	太平
Guomin zazhi	國民雜誌	Tiananmen	天安門
hequnde	合群的	tiandao	天道
Jianshe	建設	tianli	天理
Li Shizeng	李石曾	tianming	天命
Liang Ji	梁濟	tianxia	天下
Liji	禮記	Wu Zhihui	吳稚暉
Liu Shipai	劉師培	Wusi yundong	五四運動
Liyun	禮運	Yi Baisha	易白沙
Manchu	滿清	Yuan Shikai	袁世凱
Mao Dun	茅盾	Zhejiang	浙江
Mao Zedong	毛澤東	zhenwo	真我
Meiji	明治	Zhongguo gongxue	中國公學

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